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Abstract 
Financial regulation system is a critical topic as the financial industry is developing 
more and more rapidly. The UK is one of the earliest countries to start its financial 
reform and establish a single and independent commission called Financial Service 
Authority (FSA) to govern its financial business. The China Banking Regulatory 
Commission, Security Regulatory Commission and Insurance Regulatory 
Commission are the separated regulatory organizations in China. In this dissertation, 
the rationale of financial regulation is firstly outlined. Then the background of these 
agencies and the scandals in each country are described. Followed is the comparison 
of them, through which we can get the conclusion on how financial regulators should 
be and give suggestions to help improve the financial regulation and supervision of 
China. 
 
Key Words: financial regulation, regulatory body, comparison analysis, case study 
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Chapter One Introduction 
Financial governance system is one of the critical resources to eliminate the financial 
frauds, scandals and manipulation, maintaining the financial efficiency and stability 
within one country (Currie, 2003). There are different forms of financial regulators, 
with which each country is trying to regulate and supervise its financial institutions 
and markets. The UK is one of the earliest countries to start its financial reform and 
establish a single and independent commission called Financial Service Authority 
(FSA) to govern its financial business. FSA has many differences from the financial 
regulatory body of China, which is divided into three components (China Banking 
Regulatory Commission, Security Regulatory Commission and Insurance Regulatory 
Commission).  
 
The purpose of this dissertation is, therefore, to try to firstly find how financial 
regulators should be, by comparing and contrasting the governance system of FSA in 
the UK and the regulatory commissions in China, and then give suggestions to help 
improve the financial regulation and supervision of China.  
 
The dissertation includes seven chapters. Chapter two introduces the rationale of 
financial regulation and regulatory organizations for financial industry, and the 
specific characteristics of banking, insurance and security sectors within the industry. 
Then, the background of Financial Service Authority of the UK and the financial 
regulatory commissions in China will be outlined in Chapter Three. Chapter Four 
describes the methodology of the research. The comparison of the financial regulators 
in the UK and China will be conducted by analyzing five cases in Chapter Five. In 
Chapter Six, the findings will be discussed, while the conclusion and limitation will 
be explained in the last chapter. 
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Chapter Two Literature Review 
The fact is well known that “ financial services, firms that provide these services, and 
financial markets are regulated world-wide to a greater extent than are most other 
products and services”( Benston, 1999: p.13). However, on the other hand, even after 
the 1998 Asian crisis the “Washington Consensus” continued to promote free market 
policies which advocate liberalization of the financial system and release of 
government controls as a panacea for financial crises, irrespective of the extent to 
which a nation’s economy develops (Currie, 2006). There is an argument that the self 
regulating system of free market can outperform the regulated market because the 
financial regulation has counterproductive effects for achieving its objectives (Currie, 
2003). 
 
In this chapter, firstly, the definition, objectives of financial regulation are explained, 
and the two types of regulation are classified. Secondly, the role of financial regulator 
is outlined. Lastly, the regulation of specific sectors (banking, security and insurance 
sectors) is shown in details. 
 
2.1 Theory of Regulation of Financial Industry 
2.1.1 Rationale for Financial Regulation 
 
Definition of Financial Regulation 
 
Financial regulation is a form of regulation or supervision, which subjects financial 
institutions to certain requirements, restrictions and guidelines by setting rules and 
enforcing them (Kane, 2004) This may be handled by either governments or 
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non-government organizations.  
 
Objectives of Financial Regulation 
 
There are various reasons to motivate countries to regulate and supervise their 
financial institutions. Herring and Litan (1995) have summarized three main 
motivations. The first motivation is to prevent “disruptions in financial markets and 
troubles experienced by financial institutions from posing wider systemic 
risks”(Herring and Litan, 1995:p.49). Systemic risks begin with losses in one sector 
and spread contagiously to one or more financial institutions. The losses may generate 
a banking and payment system crisis, bringing harmful effects to the real economy. 
However, it does not mean that government should get involved and regulate to avoid 
systemic risks. According to Herring and Litan (1995), this does not mean 
government should intervene and regulate. If central banks act prudentially as the last 
resort of lenders, systemic crisis can be reduced or even eliminated. As to Llewellyn  
(1999), he pointed out that financial regulation can be viewed as a set of incentive 
contracts through which the regulated firms can act consistent with the objective of 
systemic risk reduction. The second motivation is to protect clients from excessive 
price and opportunistic behavior by participants in the financial market, through 
which the efficiency and integrity of the financial system can be achieved. This 
motivation is based on the consideration that the depositors and investors cannot be 
expected to assess the extent of risk of financial institutions they put their money in, 
nor to inspect the service standard of these institutions (Dale, 1996). The consumer 
protection objective calls for regulation in terms of compensation schemes, capital 
adequacy requirement, conduct of business rules and other rules to repay the losses 
arising from the insolvency of financial institutions, prevent insolvency and guarantee 
the financial service users to be treated equally. The third is various social objectives, 
ranging from inhibiting illegal activity to allocating to different sectors of the 
economy.  
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Llewellyn (1999) pointed three similar objectives, including maintaining systemic 
stability, ensuring the safety and soundness of financial institutions and protecting 
clients. He also claimed that the aims of financial regulation should be limited to 
correcting significant market imperfections and failures (i.e. externalities and 
asymmetric information), which would result in sub-optimal welfare. 
 
In addition, achieving competitive fairness is outlined as an important consideration 
by Dale (1996), where competitive fairness means the equality between financial 
institutions from different sectors (banks, security, insurance firms and etc.) and from 
different countries. 
 
Types of Financial Regulation 
 
Financial regulation can be classified into two types, prudential regulation and 
conduct of business regulation. Prudential regulation aims to prevent solvency and to 
maintain safety and soundness of financial firms, while conduct of business regulation 
focuses on the conduct of financial institutions with their customers (Baldwin and 
Cave, 1999).  
 
On the one hand, the necessity of prudential regulation lies in asymmetric customer 
information, agency problems and the post behavior of financial firms after customers 
assign their contracts (Llewellyn, 1999). Goodhart et al (1998) also committed that 
“ consumers are not in a position to judge the safety and soundness of financial 
institutions” (Goodhart et al, 1998: p. 5). Further, they identified the establishment of 
capital requirement as the main regulation for prudential purpose.  
 
On the other hand, as to conduct of business regulation, it is designed to set up rules, 
requirements and guidelines to lead to appropriate behavior of financial companies in 
dealing with their clients. Conduct of business regulation includes loyalty of financial 
institutions and their employees, compulsory information disclosure, the goods and 
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service supplying ability of financial firms(Llewellyn, 1999). Fairness of business 
practices and the way goods and service are traded are also consisted of, aiming to 
solve the principal-agent problem (Goodhart et al, 1998). Herring and Litan (1995) 
stated that conduct of business regulation can not only protect customers but also act 
as an effective measure to protect financial companies from management failure. 
 
Besides, Goodhart et al (1998) argued that there is a third regulation named systemic 
regulation, which should be distinguished with prudential regulation. It is also about 
the safety and soundness of financial firms (similar to prudential regulation approach), 
but absolutely for systemic reasons such as the possibility that the social costs of 
institutional failure is larger than the private costs. As to the regulation methods,  
systemic and prudential regulations are analogous, but they should be implemented by 
different agencies (Goodhart et al, 1998). 
 
2.1.2 Characteristics of Regulatory Body for Financial Services 
 
According to Currie (2003), the main roles of regulatory body should consist of both 
regulating and supervising. Regulating focuses mainly on preparing and issuing 
principles, codes, rules and guidelines, while supervising means the power to inspect 
the implement of rules and handle penalty towards violation of rules (Mwenda, 2006). 
Therefore, the regulators try to enforce restrictions on the financial system (i.e. 
deposit rate, interest rate, product control, geographic constrain) (Currie, 2003). 
 
The framework of financial regulatory body should be paid attention to because the 
choice of dependence level and structure affects the conduct of regulatory body and 
thus the results of financial regulation in many aspects (explain in later sections) 
(Mwenda, 2006). In terms of dependence level, the regulatory body can be either 
responsible to the government or partially or fully independent from it (Currie, 2003). 
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In terms of choice of structure, Goodhart et al (1998) stated that seven criteria should 
be considered to avoid arbitrariness. They are “the objectives of regulation”, “ the 
clarity of regulatory agencies’ remit ”, “ the costs of particular institutional structure”, 
“ the accountability of regulatory agencies”, “ Questions related to the efficiency of 
the regulatory process and the extent to which different institutional structures are 
more or less efficient at achieving their objectives”, “ the merits of a degree of 
competition in regulation”, “ issues related to the concentration of power in regulatory 
agencies”(p. 150). 
 
In the following sections, the dependence level and structures of financial regulatory 
bodies are described and compared in details, and the effects of the globalization of 
financial industry are also listed. 
 
Single vs. Multiple 
 
The institutional structure of financial service regulatory body is important to the 
efficiency and validity of financial regulation when considering the cost and objective 
achieving of the regulation (Briault, 1999). There is an argument in the choice of 
regulatory structure—which is better, a single mega regulator or multiple regulators in 
the financial service industry.  
 
As Mwenda (2006) explained, a single mega agency deals with the product and 
service of all functions across all the financial sectors, regardless of the type of 
business and the main function of the financial firms. In fact, it is a tendency that 
many countries choose to establish a single prudential regulatory agency out of the 
central bank, such as Canada (1987), the UK (1998), Australia (1998) and so on 
(Halme et al, 2000). Briault (2002) explained the tendency from four angles. Firstly, 
the development of financial conglomerates makes the regulation based on sectors 
less effective because of the merger of financial service and products with different 
functions. Secondly, an unified single regulator can achieve economies of scale and 
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scope, making resource allocation efficiently and effectively. Goodhart et al (1998) 
further mentioned that the technical requirement can get economies of scale especially, 
thus reducing the institutional costs of financial regulation. Thirdly, with a single 
mega agency, the clarity and accordance of objectives and responsibilities can brought 
various advantages to financial regulation. For example, the trade-offs among them 
can be solved in the unified agency. The co-ordination and transparency within the 
financial system are also improved (Taylor, 1995). Lastly, the accountability of 
regulation might be clear, so the regulatory management, performance, costs and 
failures can be certainly accountable. This advantage can bring such benefits that a 
single regulator is able to detect the possibility of solvency risk emerging from 
different parts of the conduct and eliminate unfairness, overlap, under lap and 
duplication. 
 
However, Goodhart et al (1998) argued that there are several opposite cases against a 
single mega agency. Primarily, the single mega regulator can perform efficiently and 
effectively only under the assumption that the financial institutions are well 
diversified and the functional difference among these institutions are corroded. 
Although it is true in many cases in the real world, there remain large distinctions 
among banks, security and insurance companies in the nature of their business 
conduct, the issued contracts and thus the type and level of financial regulation 
(Mwenda, 2006). Thomson (1996) gave an example to discuss the case. Banks usually 
have relatively short-term liabilities and less liquidate assets, while in contrast, 
insurance companies have long-term liabilities and tradable assets. As a result, the 
regulatory regimes should be different and there would be less benefits in bringing the 
regulation together. Then, a single mega regulator may not make necessary 
distinctions about the specific objectives and rationale of regulation towards different 
sectors and institutions. Even though the differences can be managed within different 
departments of the regulatory agency, these department might not interact better than 
they might within the multiple-agency model. Besides, Taylor (1995) argued that a 
single mega regulator may have excessive power, abusing its rights and being corrupt 
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inside the organization. He also mentioned the possible moral hazard and 
bureaucratism of a mega regulator’s behavior. 
 
In the opposite, if a country has several agencies to regulate and supervise the 
financial service industry, there might be excessive regulatory agencies, each 
regulating one or more specific sectors. It may also affect the general judgment 
towards the institutional management and riskiness of the whole industry (Wang, 
2000). Brailt (1999) pointed out that the multiple regulator cannot resolve the 
conflicts among different sectors, and thus cannot enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness. Besides, lack of co-ordination, potential possibility of arbitrage and 
lack of transparency is also mentioned by Taylor (2005). 
 
Although the single agency model is popular in reality, it does not imply that there is 
an optimal regulatory model for all countries and under all cases (Brailt, 2002). In fact, 
the regulatory model for a specific country depends on many considerations, such as 
the development of economy, the political background of the country, the basic 
objectives of its financial regulation and so on (Halme et al, 2000). 
 
Independence vs. State Administration 
 
“ That’s where the money is”, Willie Sutton, the infamous American bank robber 
answered when he was asked why robbing. The same might be replied for the reason 
of the government involvement in the banking and financial system – that is where the 
money is (Kroszner, 1999). However, it is really a question--whether the financial 
regulator should be under the government or independent from it, causing many 
discussions. 
 
The need for independence arises from two aspects (Quintyn and Taylor, 2004). On 
the one hand, political interference made the instable financial system even worse. 
The systemic banking crises of the 1990s ( i.e. banking crises in Latin America, Japan, 
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Korea) led to revisions of the politicization and independence of the financial 
regulator (Quintyn et al, 2007). On the other hand, the success of independent central 
bank in dealing with the inflation in the 1980s has demonstrated the efficiency and 
effective of independent regulator, and thus many countries tended to make their 
central banks outside the governments.  
 
Quintyn et al (2007) classified four dimensions of independence in their paper— 
institutional, regulatory, supervisory and budgetary independence. Institutional 
regulation is the basic description that the agency should be separated from the 
legislative and executive branches of the government. Regulatory independence 
means the agency should have a proper autonomy in issuing rules and regulating the 
implement of financial institutions. Supervisory independence is the most difficult 
dimension, referring to the ability to exercise the agency’s power to make judgment, 
license, supervision, and sanctions. Budgetary independence concerns the budget and 
resource allocation and high degree of budgetary independence means less political 
interference. Quintyn and Taylor (2004) insisted that the tendency of single regulatory 
model should be accompanied with the independence of financial regulator, in order 
to make decisions and intervene the market, which should not be controlled by the 
government not only in theory but also in practice. 
 
There are also disadvantages to give independence to financial regulators. There 
might be conflicts of interest among the public, government and agency. As Kroszner  
(1999) stated, the public pursue the maximum social welfare through regulation, 
while organization of interest group seeks protections and privileges. In addition, the 
independent agency might set rules not coincide with the theory (Quintyn and Taylor, 
2004). 
 
In fact, accountability is also under debate, which is mentioned when we discuss the 
agency independence. There is a possibility for a independent regulator to sacrifice 
public interest to pursue its own goals. In the old trade-off theory, the more 
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accountability, the less independence. However, Hüpkes et al (2005) and Quintyn et 
al (2007) offered a premise that an appropriate accountability mechanism can help to 
enhance the independence of financial regulatory agency. That is to say, 
accountability is the other side of the coin. The aim of establishing such an 
accountability mechanism is to “ arrive at a situation where no one controls the 
agency, but the agency is nonetheless under control”(Quintyn et al, 2007: p. 11). To 
achieve that, the financial regulator should conduct in a multi-principal environment, 
where the main principals are legislative, executive, judicial branches of government, 
the public and the financial service industry itself. 
 
In summary, the endorsement of agency independence remains under controversy. 
Many countries still prefer accountability more than independence. 
 
The International Dimension 
 
As the globalization develops, the financial market is increasingly interlinked (Davies 
and Green, 2008). Herring and Litan (1995) also committed that the individual 
country’s financial development is more and more dependent on that of other nations 
because of the reduction in the cost of transaction and communication.  
 
In fact, because the prudential regulation is taken at the national level, there is no 
overriding international agency to regulate global financial service, but there are 
several regulatory authorities in each specific sector, i.e. the Basel Committee, 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). This might undermine development of 
each country. For instance, one problem in the banking sector is that the jurisdiction 
of the domestic regulator is smaller than the geographic area of the financial 
companies’ business (Goodhart et al, 1998). 
 
To solve the above problem, Goodhart et al (1998) gave the full range of international 
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regulatory collaboration, which are termed as system harmonization, economic 
harmonization, international co-ordination, co-operation, extraterritorial enforcement 
and international competition. He then stated that through international collaboration, 
the business of financial institution can be regulated globally, the externalities can be 
reduces and the costs of regulation can be lowered. However, there are still 
disadvantages of international collaboration. Firstly, there are hazards in competitive 
neutrality. Different nations have different accounting standards, legal framework, 
cultures and other factors. Thus regulatory collaboration may bring about distortions 
by forcing nations to introduce the same rules. Secondly, it may induce regulatory 
arbitrage, creating a hazard named “ international competition in a laxity”(Goodhart et 
al, 1998: p. 174). In a highly interlinked financial system, the security of the industry 
depend on the weakest jurisdiction. In addition, it has the potential to increasing the 
effect of system failure, which is the result of the increasing interaction of the global 
financial system. If a financial crisis of a jurisdiction occurs, then the systemic 
stability may be threatened. 
 
Although the increasing globalization of financial system makes autarky not an 
effective option any more, it does not mean rigid collaboration is compulsory. The 
optimal choice is still to be discussed in later theories and practices. 
 
2.2 Features of Specific Sectors 
2.2.1 Banking Sector 
 
Banks (especially commercial banks) is one of the most essential sources of external 
finance which needs to be restricted tightly (Bolt and Tieman, 2001). Following the 
great financial liberalization from the 1970s, there were unprecedented number of  
bank failures over the world in the last twenty years of the twentieth century, 
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including the bank crisis of the East Asia in 1997-1998. In fact, the resolving cost of 
these bank failures were even up to 30% of GDP in some countries (Barth, et al, 
1998). Based on the recent crisis, the baking regulation is receiving considerable 
attention and extensive research. 
 
Banking regulation is rigid more than any other industry and covers a wide range of 
points in the banking business, from entry, mortgage to deposit rate and resolution of 
financial distress. According to Du and Li (2003), the most important reason of the 
banking sector causing so much regulation is that the main source of fund comes from 
deposit that can be called back at any time by its depositors. 
 
Theoretically, based on the public interest (social welfare) consideration, the banks 
should be restricted to enter other financial business such as securities and insurance 
(Barth et al, 2002). Primarily, if banks mix their business with banking and other 
broad activities, they would set up huge and complicated institutions, which neither 
private nor public agencies could effectively monitor and supervise. Then, large 
financial conglomerates may reduce competition and hence efficiency within the 
financial service industry. Besides, conflicts of interests among banking, securities 
and insurance may arise. There might be moral hazard because banks launch riskier 
activities opposite to their monetary stability objective. However, there are some 
arguments on the banking restriction, advocating that market failure is not so serious 
and the participation of government may make things even worse. Barth et al (1998) 
investigate 50 countries and find that a more restrictive regulatory country is more 
likely to suffer a bank crisis. Besides, there are also controversies on the belonging of 
banking regulation. Some insist on regulation by the government while others believe 
that the regulatory authority should be given to a nongovernment organization. 
 
In practice, there are several regulatory body at the international level to regulate the 
banking sector, including the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF). They do research and analysis on the 
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banking sector, issue standards to regulate the financial institutions especially the 
central banks of each countries and act as the regulators at the international level. 
There is also an important agency named the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, which is established in 1974. The committee set principles to avoid the 
escape of the supervision on foreign bank establishment, with capital adequacy as the 
main concern (Davies and Green, 2008). Central banks of each country play a similar 
role as the above international regulators (banking regulators outside central banks 
take the role in many countries nowadays). In brief, the main objectives of banking 
regulators are  to maintain financial and monetary stability and thus to limit bank 
failure. This is explained by Bolt and Tieman (2001). They further stated that capital 
adequacy is the primary requirement in banking regulation. Hellmann et al (2000) 
also show that capital requirement, combined with deposit rate controls can help to 
achieve Pareto-efficient results in the optimal banking regulation. 
 
2.2.2 Insurance Sector 
 
Internal and external forces in recent years have increasingly forced insurance 
regulation to respond. Significant changes in the structure and performance of the 
insurance sector have made the regulatory work even complicated. The pressure on 
the competition in the sector made insurers to assume more risks to supply clients 
more attractive products, causing more insurance failures (Klein, 1995). The 
increasing insurance failure and other problems in the insurance market raise the 
concern on the role of insurance regulation. For instance, the U.S. state insurance 
regulator was blamed to be lack of adequate resources, use unreliable information and 
coordinate poorly by the congress in 1990. Various suggestions were made on the 
more restrictive regulation of health insurance, property insurance underwriting and 
solvency (Klein, 1995). 
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Skipper and Klein (2000) mentioned two types of insurance regulatory activities. One 
is solvency regulation, and the other is market regulation. Solvency regulation tries to 
protect policyholders from the potential of the insurers unable to meet their obligation. 
Market regulation seeks to guarantee reasonable and fair products and practices. To 
achieve the protection of policyholders and the general society, insurance institutions 
should meet some regulatory standards and conduct prudently in their business. The 
standards of solvency regulation includes capital and surplus standards, financial 
reporting requirements, examination and so on, where capital and surplus standards 
are essential. Capital and surplus act as a cushion against decreases in the insurance 
firms’ assets and increases in their liabilities (Klein, 1995). In terms of market 
regulation, the vital methods are to respond to consumer complaints and to take 
market conduct examination. In addition, Skipper and Klein (2000) point out that 
insurance regulation should be fair, transparent and minimally intrusive to maintain 
financial stability and manage risks efficiently and effectively. 
 
In the real world, the most important international regulatory organization in the 
insurance sector is International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). It was 
established to respond to the interdependencies in the sector in 1994, with the aims 
“ to contribute to the improvement of insurance supervision for the protection of 
policy holders, to promote well-regarded insurance markets and to contribute to 
global financial stability”(Davies and Green, 2008: p. 73). The IAIS has developed 
guidance and principles (i.e. on capital adequacy, information disclosure, consumer 
protection and money laundering), and enhanced practice. 
 
2.2.3 Security Sector 
 
As Goshen and Parchomovsky (2005) state, the core of security regulation objective 
is to maintain competitive market so as to ensure efficiency of resources allocation, 
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which contains price accuracy and financial liquidity. They also point out that there 
are four kinds of traders in the market, insiders, information traders, liquidity traders 
and noise traders. Insiders are traders “who possess non-public information, and have 
the ability to process and analyze general market and firm specific information”(p. 5). 
Information traders specializes “in gathering and analyzing general market and firm 
specific information” (p. 5). Liquidity traders are those “who buy and hold a portfolio 
of stocks based on consumption/saving considerations independently of general 
market or firm specific information” (p. 5). The final group, noise traders, “ acts 
irrationally, falsely believing that they possess some valuable informational advantage 
or superior trading skills”(p. 5). Under the above classification, the security regulation 
should focus on information traders. That is because noise traders would reduce 
market efficiency, liquidity traders are indifferent to pricing accuracy, and insiders 
behave under “ quasi-monopolistic” environment (Goshen and Parchomovsky, 2005). 
Therefore, protecting information traders is the primary job for security regulation to 
reach market efficiency. To reach that, the principles of security regulation are divided 
into three parts, which are disclosure duties, restrictions on fraud and manipulation, 
and restrictions on insider trading. Disclosure duties reduce the costs of collecting 
information. Restrictions on fraud and manipulation also reduce the costs and help the 
traders to predict accurately. While restrictions on insider trading protect information 
traders from competing with insiders who can get non-public information and thus 
make information traders out of the market. In brief, the total effect of security 
regulation is to establish and maintain a competitive and efficient market for 
information traders. 
 
In practice, there is a parallel agent to the Basel committee in the security sector, the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which is set up in 
1983. As Davies and Green (2008) describes, the IOSCO has four main objectives. 
The first one is to enhance co-operation in promoting high standards of regulation to 
sustain a fair, sound and efficient market. The second one is to exchange the 
members’ experiences so as to develop the domestic markets. The third of all is to 
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unite the members to establish standards to effectively supervise international 
transactions in the security market. The last one is to supply mutual assistance to help 
promoting an integrate market by a strict application of the standards and also by an 
enforcement against offences. 
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Chapter Three Background 
In this chapter, the governance system of the financial regulators in the UK and China 
will be compared and contrasted, so as to find an appropriate way to regulate and 
supervise the financial industry. In details, the history, objectives, roles, organisation 
structure and accountability of both the regulators in the UK and China will be 
explained. 
3.1 Financial Services Authority (FSA UK) 
 
History 
 
The Financial Services Authority ( FSA UK) was originally incorporated on 7 June 
1985 with the name of the Securities and Investments Board Limited (SIB). The 
amalgamation of a number of financial regulators strengthened the power of the SIB, 
which changed its name to the Financial Services Authority on 28 October 1997 as 
the single regulator for the financial service industry. The first action after 
establishment was transferring from the Bank of England to the FSA UK the 
responsibility of banking industry supervision in June 1998. In May 2000, the UK 
Listing Authority, whose responsibility used to be taken by London Stock Exchange, 
was also incorporated into the FSA UK. The Financial Services and Markets Act, 
which was enacted in June 2000 and implemented in December 2001, transferred 
more responsibilities to the FSA UK from other organizations, such as Building 
Societies Commission, Investment Management Regulatory Organization, Personal 
Investment Authority, Securities and Futures Authority and so on. Then, the 
legislation gave new responsibility to the FSA UK to prevent market abuse 
 20
particularly. In addition, it took responsibility for mortgage regulation in October 
2004 and general insurance business in January 2005.  
The FSA UK has become one of the largest and most influential financial regulators 
in the world, leading over 10,000 financial service institutions in the UK financial 
markets. 
Organization Structure 
The FSA UK is an independent non-government organization, whose statutory power 
is given by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. It is a company limited by 
guarantee and funded by the firms it regulated in the financial services 
industry. Within the FSA UK, there are three main business units named Operations 
Business Unit, Retail Markets, and Wholesale and Institutional Markets. In terms of 
the board, the Treasury appoints a Chairman, a Chief Executive Officer, three 
Managing Directors, and nine non-executive directors. The Board sets the FSA UK’s 
overall policy, but leave day-to-day decisions and management of the staff to the 
Executive. Chart 1 below shows the organization structure of the FSA UK in details. 
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Chart 1 Organization Structure of the FSA UK (September 2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
Information for Firms and Consumers 
The FSA is accountable to Treasury Ministers, and through them to Parliament. It is 
operationally independent of Government and is funded entirely by the firms it 
regulates. The FSA is an open and transparent organisation and provides full 
information for firms, consumers and others about its objectives, plans, policies and 
rules, including through this website. An area of this website provides information 
specifically for consumers on financial products, regulation and their rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/About/Who/pdf/orgchart.pdf 
 
Objectives and Roles 
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The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 sets out the FSA UK four statutory 
objectives. They are market confidence: maintaining confidence in the financial system; 
public awareness: promoting public understanding of the financial system; consumer 
protection: securing the appropriate degree of protection for consumers; and reduction 
of financial crime: reducing the extent to which it is possible for a business carried on 
by a regulated person to be used for a purpose connected with financial crime. The 
objectives are supported by a set of principles of good regulation which the FSA must 
regard to when discharging its functions (i.e. efficiency and economy, role of 
management, proportionality, innovation, international character, competition). 
There are also other objectives. One is to provide political and public accountability 
(The annual report will outline an assessment of the extent to which it has met the 
goals). The other is to govern the way the FSA UK carries out its general functions (i.e. 
rule-making, determining the general policy). In addition, it also has the objective to 
assist in providing legal accountability (it can be challenged in the courts by judicial 
review when failing to consider its objectives). 
In addition, under the circumstance that the FSA follows the four statutory objectives, it 
has the discretion and flexibility to discharge its responsibility, which makes the 
accountability even more important (Briault, 1999). 
Accountability 
In the draft Financial Services and Markets 1998, there are a set of accountability 
principles. Firstly, the FSA Chairman and Board are appointed and removable by the 
Treasury. Secondly, when setting its policies and exercising its powers, the FSA should 
conduct in accordance to its statutory objectives and act in an appropriate way to meet 
these objectives. Thirdly, the annual report of the FSA should contain the discharge of 
its functions and the extent to which it has met its general aims. In the annual report, the 
committee of the non-executive members of the Board should give the result of 
reviewing whether the FSA functions in an economic and efficient way and reviewing 
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the condition of the FSA’s internal financial controls. Fourthly, the Treasury has the 
power to make inquiries of the FSA on regulatory matters of public concern, and the 
power to direct the FSA to change its rules, procedures and practices. Finally, the FSA 
should follow the decisions of an independent financial services tribunal (Briault, 
1999). Beyond the above issues, the Financial Services and Markets 2000 has 
established public reporting mechanisms, mechanisms of direct input by practitioners 
and consumers to the regulatory process, mechanisms for independent review of the 
FSA’s rules and decisions, commissioning and publishing mechanisms, and clear 
governance structures (Briault, 2002). 
Briault (1999) points out a further aspect of accountability: the responsibilities must be 
clearly allocated between the Treasury, the Bank of England and the FSA. The 1997 
Memorandum of Understanding (Financial Services Authority, 1997, pages 34-39) 
has set out roles of each institution. The Treasury has the power to set out the overall 
responsibilities of the institutional structure and the legislation of regulation. The 
Bank of England is responsible to the overall stability of the financial system (i.e. 
monetary system, payment system), and to the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
financial service industry. The FSA has the responsibility for the authorization and 
supervision of the financial markets and financial service firms. In other words, the 
Memorandum has established the framework for the FSA to closely co-operate with 
the Treasury and the Bank of England in terms of information collecting and 
exchange, consultation on policy changes and the setting up of a committee to monthly 
discuss issues and cases on financial stability (Briault, 2002). 
 
However, although the FSA is an independent organization funded by firms it regulates 
through fines, fees and compulsory levies, Ferran (2003) criticizes the extent to which 
the accountability is established for the reason that the government can still influence 
the FSA (i.e. through the Board appointment). 
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3.2 The Three Financial Regulatory Commissions in China 
3.2.1 China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 
History 
On April 26,2003 the Tenth National People's Congress Standing Committee at its 
second meeting made a decision that the CBRC will exercise the duties on banking 
management and supervision which originally exercised by the People’s Bank of China. 
The Tenth National People's Congress decided to approve the State Council reform 
plan that the China Banking Regulatory Commission will carry out its supervision and 
management responsibilities 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (hereafter CBRC), China's banking industry 
regulator under the State Council, has officially started operation after its establishment 
on 28 April 2003. As a government agency, the CBRC is to improve banking regulation 
and supervision in China, according to the State Council's press release on 29 May 
2003.The CBRC is a ministerial-level organization under the State Council. It is 
entrusted with the regulation and supervision of banking institutions, asset management 
companies, trust and investment companies and other depository financial institutions.1 
Organization Structure 
The CBRC comprises seventeen departments and sets up 36 independent planning 
banking bureaus at the provincial level, banking sub-bureaus at the prefecture level, 
and efficient resident offices at county level 
Chart 2 Organization Structure of the CBRC 
 
                                                        
1
 www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/info/yjhjj/index.jsp. 
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Source: http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/info/yjhjj/index.jsp 
 
Objectives and Roles 
There are four main objectives of the CBRC. The first one is to protect the interests of 
depositors and consumers through prudential and effective supervision. The second is 
to maintain market confidence. The third is to enhance public understanding of modern 
finance though consumer education and information disclosure. The last one is to 
reduce or eliminate financial crimes. These objectives are supported by a set of 
principles of good regulation, including international competitiveness, efficient and 
cost-effective criteria, supervisory and regulatory boundary setting, and fair and orderly 
competition 
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Based on the four objectives, the CBRC mainly focuses on a range of functions: 
establishing supervisory rules and regulations governing the banking institutions; 
authorizing the establishment, changes, termination and business scope of the banking 
institutions; publishing statistics and reports of the overall banking industry in 
accordance with relevant regulations; consolidated supervision to assess, monitor and 
mitigate the overall risks of each banking institution; urging banks to maintain internal 
control; promoting supervisory transparency in line with international standards and 
practices. 
Accountability 
The CBRC is a government agency under the State Council and is responsible for the 
regulation and supervision of banks, asset management companies, trust and 
investment companies as well as other deposit-taking financial institutions. According 
to the State Council, dispatched institutions of the CBRC should be unified leadership 
and management. The activities of CBRC agencies are supervised by the State Council 
audit, monitoring organizations and other organizations1. 
In terms of the staff, the official staff should have their knowledge and operational 
experience adapted to their serving. Agency staff should be devoted to their duties 
according to the law. They must not use their positions to seek illegitimate interests, 
must not work in financial institutions and other enterprises in the part-time positions.  
The supervision and management procedures of the CBRC should be opened and a 
supervision and management system and internal supervision system should be 
established. Local governments, relevant departments at all levels shall cooperate and 
assist the CBRC agencies in investigating and dealing with illegal financial practices 
such as supervision and management activities.  
                                                        
1
 China State Council (2003), ‘The Law of Banking’. 
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3.2.2 China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
History 
As the opening and reform of China began and continued in the past decades, the 
development of securities market in China has inevitably led to the establishment of a 
centralized market regulatory body. The establishment of the State Council Securities 
Commission (hereafter SCSC) and the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(hereafter CSRC) in October 1992 marked the formation of this regulatory body in the 
securities and futures markets. The SCSC is the state authority responsible for 
exercising centralized market regulation, while the CSRC is the SCSC’s executive 
branch responsible for conducting supervision and regulation of the securities markets 
in accordance with the law. In April 1998, pursuant to the State Council Reform Plan, 
the SCSC and the CSRC merged to form one ministry organization directly under the 
State Council. Both the power and the functions of the CSRC have been strengthened 
after the reform. A centralized securities supervisory system was thus set up1. 
Organization Structure 
The CSRC has one chairman, four deputy-chairmen, one secretary general, and two 
deputy-secretaries generals. There are thirteen functional departments, three 
subordinate centers, and one special committee, with ten regional offices set up in key 
cities around the country and a missionary office in each province, autonomous region, 
city directly under the jurisdiction of the State Council, and city enjoying the 
provincial-level status in the state economic plan. The organization structure of the 
CSRC is described in Chart 3. 
Chart 3 Organization Structure of the CSRC 
                                                        
1
 http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n575667/n641473/n4355556/index.html 
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Source: http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/index.html 
 
Objectives and roles 
The CSRC aims to establish a centralized supervisory system for securities and 
futures markets, to strengthen the supervision over securities, stock and futures 
exchange markets, listed companies, fund management companies investing in the 
securities, securities and futures investment consulting firms, and other intermediaries 
involved in the securities and futures business, to increase the abilities to prevent and 
handle financial crisis, and to organize the drafting of laws and regulations for 
securities markets. 
Accountability 
 
 29
According to the State Council’s state, the CSRC should obey relevant laws to 
implement the securities market supervision and administration, and keep the 
securities market running in order and operating legally1. 
 
The CSRC should work with other financial institutions of the State Council. There 
should be a information sharing mechanism between them. As a result, the CSRC 
perform its duties, carrying out supervision and inspection or investigation according 
to the law, and the relevant departments shall cooperate with it. In addition, The 
official workers should not serve in the supervised institutions. 
3.2.3 China Insurance Regulatory Commission˄CIRC˅ 
History 
The China Insurance Regulatory Commission (hereafter CIRC), established on 18 
November 1998, is authorized by the State Council to conduct administration, 
supervision and regulation of the Chinese insurance market. In 2003, the State 
Council upgraded the CIRC from a semi-ministerial institution to a ministerial 
institution directly under the State Council, and expanded the size of the CIRC in 
terms of staff, internal setup, and local offices2. 
 
Organizational Structure of the CIRC 
 
At present, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission has set 35 independent 
planning agencies in the provinces, municipalities, autonomous regions and cities An 
agency under the CIRC has the authority to fulfill the insurance industry within the 
jurisdiction of the administrative functions in accordance with relevant laws, 
                                                        
1 China State Council (2006), ‘The Law of Securities’. 
2 http://www.circ.gov.cn/web/site0/tab59/ 
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regulations and guidelines, policies in order to achieve a unified supervision and 
management of the insurance market 
 
General Office
Organizational Structure of the 
CIRC
Development and Reform Department 
Finance and Accounting Department 
Property Insurance Regulatory Department 
 Personal Insurance Regulatory Department 
 Insurance Intermediaries Regulatory Department 
Insurance Fund Management Regulatory Department 
 International Department 
Legal Affairs Department 
Statistics and IT Department 
 Local Offices Administration Department 
Personnel and Education Department 
Disciplinary Inspection Department 
 
Source: http://www.circ.gov.cn/web/site0/tab40/ 
 
Major Roles and Responsibilities  
The key role of the CIRC is to maintain the stability of the Chinese insurance industry 
operation. Based on that, firstly, the CIRC formulates policies, strategies and plans 
regarding the development of the insurance industry. Secondly, it examines and 
approves the establishment of insurance companies and their branches, insurance 
groups and insurance holding companies. Thirdly, it examines and confirms the 
qualifications of the senior managerial personnel in all insurance-related organizations, 
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and establishes the basic qualification standards for insurance practitioners. Fourthly, 
it supervises the solvency and market conduct of insurance companies according to 
law, manages the insurance security fund, and monitors the insurance guarantee 
deposits. Lastly, it lays down standards for the information system of the insurance 
industry, insurance risk-assessment, risk-warning and risk-monitoring systems.  
Accountability 
The CIRC should implement its actions in accordance with the provisions of the 
Insurance Law of China and the responsibilities which the State Council awarded. 
The implementation of supervision and management of the insurance industry should 
follow the openness, fairness principle to maintain the insurance market order and 
protect the insured and the beneficiary's legitimate rights and interests1. 
In addition, an information sharing mechanism should be established between the 
CIRC, the central bank and other financial management institutions. 
3.2.4 Cooperation of the three commissions 
In respect of the financial supervision responsibility, the CBRC, CSRC and CIRC 
coordinate to avoid duplication of regulatory vacuum and supervision, and to improve 
the efficiency of supervision so that the financial innovation could be encouraged. 
The three commissions work together on important regulatory issues and cross-sector, 
cross-border supervision of complicated issues. The tripartite negotiate on the 
establishment of regular information-sharing mechanism. Every party should strictly 
follow the principle of client confidentiality, ensuring that the use of this information 
is limited to their duties unless the law stipulates the information not available to third 
parties. 
                                                        
1
 China State Council (2009), ‘The Law of Insurance’. 
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3.3 Differences between the Financial Regulatory Bodies in Both 
Countries 
In this sector, the differences between the financial regulatory bodies in both countries 
are outlined. 
Organization structure 
As described before, the FSA UK is an independent organization (company limited).  
On the contrast, the CBRC, CSRC and CIRC are separated from the central bank of 
China and established as government organizations. Therefore, the FSA UK is funded 
by the fees which come from the regulated financial institutions in the markets, while 
the three regulatory commissions are operated through taxation. 
Accountability 
In terms of accountability, the FSA UK is responsible to the Treasury and should 
follow a set of accountability principles. For the CBRC, CSRC and CIRC, they are 
designed to be accountable to the State Council. 
Cost-benefit Analysis 
The cost-benefit is defined as “an estimate of cost together with an analysis of the 
benefit will arise if the proposed rules are made” (Consultation Paper 187, the FSA 
UK, 2003: p.1 in Annex Ċ) The FSA UK needs a cost-benefit analysis. There are six 
aspects, to which should be paid attention, and the third requirement is “the principle 
that a burden and restriction that is placed on a person or on the carrying on of a 
regulated activity, should be proportionate to the benefit the provision is generally 
intended to confer” (Briault, 1999). 
The CBRC, CSRC and CIRC do not implement the cost-benefit analysis. The three 
commissions all belong to the government, the rules are discussed and authorized by 
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the government then finally be implemented. The three commissions are reforming, 
changing their rules to adapt to the market and society. But before a new rule is 
implemented, there are no estimation of the cost and benefits. 
Transparency 
There are three laws in China which the CBRC, CSRC and CIRC should follow in 
their activities. The three commissions should give an annual report about their 
regulatory policies and activities in the last year and give some suggestions in the 
coming year. 
Even there are many rules which can promise the transparency about the three 
commissions, the bureaucracy is some severity. Many of their decisions are made by 
someone in power and the companies just should follow. The commissions all with 
responsibility for the China government, there are no efficiency institutions to 
supervise them. 
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Chapter Four Methodology 
4.1 Research Ambition 
Through writing this dissertation, what I want to investigate is how the FSA UK and 
the three regulatory commissions of China conduct in maintaining financial stability 
and supervising the financial institutions, and try to find an appropriate way for the 
regulatory body to establish the governance system by comparing and contrasting the 
regulatory bodies in the UK and China. 
4.2 Research Methodology 
4.2.1 Reasons of Case Study 
To take the above investigation, I have chosen case study as the methodology of the 
research. Case study is an examination of a single example of a phenomena or 
organization in details (Flyvbjerg, 2005). Campbell (1996) doubts the case study as a 
scientific method because of the controversies on the theory, reliability and validity of 
case study. However, there is an argument by Flyvbjerg (2005) on the 
misunderstanding of case study, based on the concept “context-dependent knowledge”. 
According to Flyvbjerg (2005), case study can produce context-dependent knowledge, 
making people develop from beginners who only know theories and rules to virtuoso 
experts. He further points out that social science cannot develop by purely creating 
context-independent theory and roles. Rather, context-dependent knowledge is key to 
the research of social science and human learning, and case study is a suitable way to 
produce such knowledge. Hartley (2004) also insists that case study is widely used 
and well suited in social science, especially in organizational studies, because of the 
rich data it contains in the context. The opportunity for case study to investigate issues 
in depth means that the theory can develop through “the systematic piecing together 
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of detailed evidence to generate (or replicate) theories of broader interest” ( Hartley,  
2004:p.324).  
There are several reasons to take case study as the methodology in organizational 
research. Firstly, case study is useful when considering how the organizational 
structure affects social processes (Hartley et al, 1991). Secondly, Case study is an 
essential tool in cross-national comparative research because it enables people to get 
an intimate understanding of the concept, relationship and differences within and 
among organizations in different countries. Pettigrew and Fenton (2001) used case 
studies to successfully get a deep understanding of culture and context to investigate 
networks between organizations in various countries. Thirdly, once the case study is 
designed, it is important to consider whether the investigation focuses on a specific 
case or on the whole unit. Hartley (2004) suggests that case study supports both 
considerations. Therefore, case study can be viewed as a suitable methodology in 
cross-national comparison analysis and in policy and organization researches. What 
this dissertation investigates is how the financial regulatory bodies govern their 
financial business by examining the financial scandals and comparing the measure the 
regulatory bodies have taken, so case study is an appropriate methodology. 
4.2.2 Generalization from Case Study 
For a researcher using quantitative methods, generalization can be easily achieved by 
such techniques as sample size, which is called statistical generalization. While in 
terms of case study, the attention should be paid to analytical generalization because 
there may be inadequate cases to reach statistical generalization. The detailed 
investigation of issues in context can reflect the general processes to the organization, 
and in this way, analytical generalization is accomplished. In other words, the key to 
generalization for case study is not the population, but the theoretical propositions 
(Hartley, 2004). To ensure the generalization as strong as possible, we can use 
existing literature to check the extent of generalization to which the findings get and 
establish a conceptual framework (Eisenhardt, 1989; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998). 
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Flyvbjerg (2005) also claims that strategic choice of cases may improve the 
generalizability of case study. 
4.2.3 Data Selection and Collection 
As explained before, generalization can be obtained by case study in qualitative 
research if the cases are picked up correctly and properly. There are four ways to help 
achieve generalization: “combining qualitative research with quantitative measures of 
populations, purposive sampling guided by time and resources, theoretical sampling 
and using an analytic model which assumes that generalizability is present in the 
existence of any case” (Silverman, 2000: p. 103). For the data availability and validity, 
I have used theoretical sampling to choose the cases which follow a theoretical logic, 
and thus the cases are chosen according to the relative theory and rationale. 
As to the number of cases chosen, Hartley (2004) suggests that conducting multiple 
cases can help increase confidence and credibility by cross-checking and comparing. 
Hence I have chosen two cases of the FSA UK and one case for each regulatory 
commission of China. 
In terms of the type of the cases, multiple case studies should ensure the comparison 
of processes and contexts, so the type of cases chosen is vital to the research. 
Silverman (2000) claims that negative samples with the investigation are likely to 
make more sense. Flyvbjerg (2005) supports the idea with the conception of extreme 
cases, which means to obtain information and conduct analysis on unusual instances. 
In my dissertation, I use five financial scandals that are especially problematic for 
comparing and contrasting to reveal more information.  
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Chapter Five Outline of the Scandals 
5.1 FSA was wrong over L&G Mis-selling  
The FSA had claimed that Legal & General had systematically mis-sold endowment 
policies between 1997 and 1999 by failing to make sure that its sales people could sell 
these products to only the customers who are suitable and failing to explain to 
customers the risks of the products (Winslet.J,23 Jan 2005). As a result, the FSA 
imposed a financial penalty of £ 1.1 m on L & G in October 2003. The FSA UK asked 
the assistant of the Price Water House Coopers (thereafter PWC) to do the research. 
The PWC investigated 250 persons who hand purchased this product, among which 
60 customers of mis-selling were found. The FSA UK got a conclusion that the Legal 
& General committed a widespread mis-selling. Therefore, through the Regulatory 
Decision Committee (thereafter RDC)[8] , the FSA UK decided to fined the L & G. 
However, L & G insisted that they sell the product properly and it decided to refer to 
the Financial Services & Market Tribunal (thereafter Tribunal)[9] instead of accepting 
the punishment. L & G claimed that the FSA’ s investigation is unfair to them.  
What made this case so attractive is that L&G was the first of the major financial 
institutions to refer a case to the Tribunal (Kirsten, 2005). The case is important not 
only because it is the first brought by a major UK company before the tribunal, but 
the criticisms could have far-reaching consequences for how the FSA takes action 
against firms it believes have breached its rules. After hearing appeals in public 
against the FSA's rulings, the Tribunal rejected the regulator's allegation that L&G 
was guilty of widespread mis-selling. The tribunal did uphold the FSA's decision that 
L & G's sales process had been "defective". However, the tribunal also said it is 
highly likely to reduce the £ 1.1 million fine slapped on L&G by the FSA to £ 
575,000. (Telegraph,2005; Freshfieds Bruckhaus Deringer,2005). The central charge 
which the L & G imposed on FSA was that the RDC relied entirely on a report for the 
FSA by PWC based on a sample of 250 policyholders. According to the tribunal, the 
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RDC found L & G guilty of mis-selling when the PWC report "did not of itself 
establish guilt or aim to do so" (Telegraph, 2005; Freshfieds Bruckhaus Deringer, 
2005). At the end, the FSA UK reduced the financial penalty to £575,000 and 
reviewed its investigation and enforcement procedures. As was strongly accused by 
the Tribunal, the RDC will make some change in its role and procedure (Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005). 
5.2 Citigroup Global Markets Global Investment (UK) 
Because of a breach of Principles 2 and 3 of the FSA UK’s principles for business, the 
FSA UK made a decision to impose a financial penalty of fining £13.9 million on City 
Global Markets Limited (thereafter CGML). Principle 2 of FSA UK’s Principles for 
Business provides that “a firm must conduct its business with due skill, care and 
diligence” and Principles 3 requires that “a firm must take reasonable care to 
organize and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk 
management systems.”[11]. 
As depicted by the FSA, on the morning of 2 August 2004 between 09:12 and 10:29 
the desk bought 66,214 futures contracts on Eurex (equivalent to 55,000 Bund 
futures). Then between 10.28 and 10.29 the desk sold €11.3 billion of bonds in 18 
seconds on MTS, which was equivalent to an average day's trading volume on the 
platform, and also sold around €1.5 billion on other domestic cash markets, resulting 
in a total sale of €12.9 billion bonds. This left CGML with an unexpected short 
position which was closed out at 11.25 through the purchase of €3.8 billion of bonds 
on MTS. In doing so CGML bought back at a lower price some of the bonds it had 
earlier sold, further adding to their profit. The effect on MTS was a temporary 
disruption to the volume of bonds quoted and traded on the platform, sharp falls in 
bond prices and in some cases the temporary withdrawal of some participants from 
quoting on that platform. CGML made a profit of $18.2 million (£9,960,860) on 2 
August 2004 as a result of the sale of the long cash position and subsequent buy-back 
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of cash bonds. "CGML planned, authorized and executed a trading strategy without 
having due regard to the risks and likely consequences of its action for the efficient 
and orderly operation of the MTS platform”, said Hector Sants, FSA Managing 
Director for Wholesale Business (Sants.H, 8 June 2005). In addition, the FSA UK 
claimed that adequate and prior approval from the senior management to this trading 
is lacked that time. There is also no proper system for the supervision of its trades and 
the trading standard was not established. This is all because CGML failed to take 
reasonable care to organize and control its affairs responsibly and effectively. 
According to the FSA UK, the financial penalty on CGML was divided into two parts: 
one is relinquishment of the profits made from the transaction of £9.86 million and 
the rest of £4 million was additional penalty (Tang. M, 30 June 2005). Besides, 
although the CGML did not violate any specific securities laws of the UK, and 
German authorities did not decide to prosecute because of no obvious evidence of 
criminal operation in March 2005, the FSA UK claims that financial institutions have 
a responsibility to maintain an efficient, orderly and clean financial 
market.(International Financial Law Review, 2004). 
5.3 Gao Shan Case 
Bank of China, the largest foreign exchange bank of China, confirmed that one of its 
sub-branches in Heilongjiang Province was involved in a financial fraud. The scandal 
emerged on 15 January 2005 when Northeast Expressway, a Shanghai-listed A share 
company, announced that 290 million yuan (US$34.9 million) of shareholders' funds 
deposited with the branch was missing (Huang Z.H and Li Zh.Y, Feb.2007). Deposits 
by other companies, amounting to as much as 700 million yuan (US$84.3 million), 
also vanished. The scandal went as following. Gao Shanˈdirector of Hesong Street 
branch of Bank of China , together with Li Dongzhe, the chairman of the Beijing 
Century Investment Company, used high interest rates as bait to attract a large number 
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of enterprises to deposit. Then they cashed the money in steps from other banks and 
made the money abroad through underground banks.  
The scandal has negatively impacted the bank's reputation. After investigating, 36 
people involved in this case were severely punished by the headquarter of Bank of 
China. Among them, 8 people have been fired, 6 people have been removed, and the 
other 22 were given the administrative punishment (Li.N 2009). Gao Shan, Liu Tao 
and Sun Jia were expelled from the position of the Bank of China. In terms of the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), it intervened in the case rapidly, 
carrying out detecting with the public security organizations after receiving the report. 
At the same time the CBRC sent risk warning to the Bank of China, requesting it to 
further intensify its reform and construct a sound risk management system. The notice 
“Increase Efforts to Prevent the Operation Risk”, which was published by the CBRC 
on 28 March 2005 stated that, at present, the banking institutions on operational risk 
identification and control can not adapt to business development problems. There is a 
lack of an effective system for monitoring the implementation of the provisions in 
banking institutions to prevent management risk and weak internal controls. Cases 
frequently occur, resulting in loss of bank funds. To end this, the banking institutions 
must work harder to take further measures to prevent and control operational risk 
effectively. Thirteen views were put forward by the CBRC in this notice to prevent 
the operational risk. 
5.4 Guangxia Case 
The Guangxia (Yinchuan) Industry Company Limited, which listed in 1994 in 
Shenzhen Stock Market, still changed its main business constantly after listing. From 
1998, the company began to create "the myth of profit". After investigating, such a 
fraud was simply carried out in this way-- From 1998 to 2001, Guangxia totally made 
a false income of 1.046 billion yuan, less recasting 4945.34 million yuan, resulting in 
inflated profits of 771 million yuan, of which, inflated profit 17,761,000 yuan in 
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1998 ,178 million yuan and 567 million yuan in 1999 and 2000, respectively. Profit of 
771 million yuan is a huge "bubble", and the company took off by using the half-year 
reports and the annual report, attracting so many investors to fell into the trap(Wang, 
2002). In September 2001, because of involving in the Guangxia case, Shenzhen 
Zhongtianqin accounting agency has virtually disintegrated. The Ministry of Finance 
announced in early September that they intended to revoke the CPA qualification of 
Liu Jiarong, Xu Linwen, and also revoke the accounting firm's practice, together with 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission to revoke its securities, futures-related 
business licenses. At the same time, they will look into the responsibility of the 
director of the Zhongtianqin accounting firm. 
Under the "Securities Act" provisions of section 177, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission decided to impose a fine of 600,000 yuan on Guangxia and ordered it to 
correct their faults. View of part of the responsibility for Guangxia has been 
transferred to judicial organs for investigation of its criminal responsibility. 
Additionally, in accordance with the relevant provisions, the CSRC issued the 
administrative penalty decision, which means that China's securities tort 
compensation cases accepted into the implementation phase. 
5.5 Ping An Case 
On 22 May, 2002, Xuzhou branch of Ping An Insurance Company (life insurance) 
signed a single "Decade Hongxiang Additional Term Life". In that year, this single 
business was well known in the industry- 98 million yuan premium for 10 years, 
which was one of the largest life insurance businesses alone in China. However, only 
after less than a year, the disputes between the two salesmen Li Hua and He Lian who 
got the big insurance order let the glory come to truth (Zi and Fang, 2005). 
In 2002, He Lian got the first year insurance commission of more than 1.90 million 
yuan, and again in June 2003 received a renewal commission of 480,000 yuan. 
According to the agreements between He Lian and Li Hua, He Lian should give 20% 
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of the total commission to Li Hua if the total number was over 100,000 yuan, but He 
Lian did not give her a penny. On 9 April, 2003, Li Hua found the lawyer Liu 
Maotong and hoped to return to court to get her commission back. But after a survey, 
Liu found that there was a series of amazing policy violations in the insurance 
agreement- the center branch of Ping An Insurance Company in Xuzhou provided a 
commitment to the power plants which other insurance company could not provide. In 
the insurance agreement, the employees of the power plant is committed to receive the 
survival benefit after the expiration of the agreement, receiving Hongxiang plus 
dividends, which may be higher by 6%,which is an illegal interest rate. As early as 10 
June, 1999, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) has expressly 
provides that the issuance should not exceed the scheduled rate of 2.5% compound 
interest in life insurance policy.  
After a series of independent investigations, from April 2003, Liu Maotong began to 
complain about the problem to the Ping An Insurance Company. In 2004, Liu 
Maotong wrote to the China Insurance Regulatory Commission, and got no results. 
He called the hot line released by the CIRC and also got no answer. In desperation, 
Liu had to report to the media. Early in March of this year, a well-known newspaper 
sent a reporter to Xuzhou interviewed all the parties concerned, and prepared to report 
the matter, but for some unknown reasons, the newspaper did not publish the report. 
Ping An Insurance Company and Xuzhou Power Plant shortly have reached an 
agreement that the agreement signed before was cancelled, settling the matter before 
listing in Hong Kong on June 24. 
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Chapter 6 Discussion 
6.1 Differences of the Regulatory Methods Between the UK and 
China 
6.1.1 General Principle 
 
The FSA UK has published “general statement of the fundamental obligations of 
firms under the regulatory system” as the general principle to conduct financial 
business. Besides FSMA, the FSA Handbook and other laws, the FSA UK can impose 
penalty if behavior of the financial institutions against the general principle of 
business which is established by the FSA UK itself is detected. 
 
On the contrast, the CBRC, CSRC and CIRC have not set up any general principles. 
During regulation and supervision, their main gist is a series of basic laws, such as the 
Law of Banking, the Law of Securities and the Law of Insurance. In addition, they 
also conduct under the State Council, according to the acts of banking, securities and 
insurance which outline the properties, objectives, responsibilities, obligations and 
accountability of the three commissions. However, the financial institutions which do 
not behave properly would not be punished immediately under these laws. That is 
because the regulatory laws of the CBRC, CSRC and CIRC only set the ideal 
situation of the financial practice and there is seldom any detailed standard to support 
the three commissions to make a penalty decision. 
 
6.1.2 Discretion on Fine 
 
From the financial scandals of the UK, it is concluded that the main method of 
punishment the FSA UK gave is fine, which compensates to the violation of public 
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interest and also a source is funding for the operation and management of the FSA 
itself. The amount of the fine is also under the discretion of the FSA UK. In addition, 
it has other methods to punish the sanctions of the financial service firms and these 
methods are used carefully and properly. 
 
For China, we can see from the Guangxia Case in the previous chapter that a fine of 
600,000 yuan is imposed to Guangxia. Therefore, we can conclude that the CBRC, 
CSRC and CIRC also have the right to impose fine. The amount of fine is determined 
according to the law by the extent of seriousness of the scandal. But this is not the 
main step for the three commissions to maintain the stability of the financial market 
and protect consumers. The most important steps for them are educating the illegal 
firms and give guideline to other firms after the scandal. 
6.1.3 Inspection System 
In the UK, there is a system called the FSA complaint scheme, which is used to deal 
with complaints of financial firms from both inside and outside of the FSA UK. The 
FSA UK also published “the Financial Inspection Basic Guideline” and “Inspection 
manual” to support the inspection. The FSA complaint scheme system was set up in 
2001 in FSMA, and the first user is an outside organization, Legal & General. L & G 
referred this case to the Tribunal. The FSA UK changed the fine from £ 1.1 m to 
£575,000 and reviewed its investigation and enforcement procedures as a result. It 
revealed the efficiency and effectiveness of the complaint scheme. 
 
On the other hand, in China, the CBRC, CSRC and CIRC are all government 
organization under the administration of State Council. The State Council would 
review the reports of the three commissions. At the same time, the tribunal would 
accept the referral to protect the rights of the financial institutions. However, the 
media inspection is rather weak in China. In the Ping An Insurance case, it is obvious 
that the media was forced to counsel the investigation and news report, so as to 
maintain the interest of the CIRC. 
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6.1.4 Transparency 
 
In the UK, transparency is viewed as one of the most important criteria to evaluate the 
conduct of a public organization. Hence the FSA UK has paid much attention on 
transparency. Information on the FSA, the solution to the financial scandals and the 
related news can be reached from the papers and websites easily. 
 
On the contrast, the media is partially controlled by the government in China. Further, 
the bureaucracy is so serious that information disclosure is difficult. The investigation, 
unlike that in the UK, does not process publicly. The public would only get the results 
of the investigation. Although the CBRC, CSRC and CIRC have their own websites, 
there are more introductions of the organizations, related laws and reports which 
mainly include the approval announcement of new financial companies and branches. 
6.1.5 Sources of Reconstruction 
In the UK, the fees to sustain the operation and management of the FSA are mainly 
received from the financial firms it regulated. It is a company limited, and thus cannot 
use public funds to help prevent financial failure of a financial institution. Oppositely, 
for instance, once a bankruptcy id detected, the FSA might leave the institution 
instead of saving it. 
 
However, the situation is just on the opposite in China. The government (including the 
CBRC, CSRC and CIRC) would use the funding which comes from the taxpayers’ 
money to increase capital to save the financial institutions, especially when the state 
owned banks are tracked in the financial disaster. Besides, when the state owned 
financial companies are preparing to list on the stock market, the government even 
help to spread good news, avoid the emerge of negative effects and raise capital to 
reach the relative requirements. 
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6.1.6 Use of External Audit 
The FSA UK asked PwC to do the investigation in the Legal & General case. Besides 
it, the National Economic Research Associate (NERA) is another organization to help 
conduct the investigation. Therefore, it is obvious that external audit is generally used 
by the FSA UK. 
 
Unlike that of the FSA UK, the CBRC, CSRC and CIRC would hold conferences to 
let the professionals to give suggestions on research, but it is difficult to find support 
that they consider external audit as a compulsory method for research. This is partially 
because the CBRC, CSRC and CIRC, as the government organizations, find it 
difficult to choose the consultant institution under the fair principle. 
6.2 Further Discussion 
As discussed above, there are several factors which contribute to these differences, 
especially the organization structure (independence or state administration). Here, 
PEST analysis, which is an effective method to analyze the political, economic, social 
and technological factors to make the differences of the regulatory bodies in the UK 
and China. 
 
Firstly, in terms of the political factor, the organization structure is essential to bring 
the differences. On the one hand, the FSA UK is an independent company limited, 
and thus has more flexibility. On the other hand, the CBRC, CSRC and CIRC in 
China are government organizations administrated by the State Council. Therefore, 
the first and most important objective is financial stability, and bureaucracy is a 
significant character which makes the regulatory bodies more political. 
 
Secondly, in terms of economic factor, as the three commissions of China are funded 
by the taxation, the source of operation fees are more stable than that of the UK, 
making the three regulatory bodies in China more powerful in the financial crisis. 
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While the FSA UK charge fees from its regulated firms, it pays more attention to the 
cost-benefit analysis. 
 
Thirdly, public awareness and democracy are main reasons in the social factor. The 
UK has a long history of democracy and the public call for more information 
disclosure and broader access to the necessary information. 
 
Lastly, the FSA UK established earlier and has formed a more mature mechanism for 
investigation, regulation, supervision and inspection. In China, less technological 
means are used by the government. 
 
In addition, the FSA UK seems to take more time to conduct the regulation and 
supervision in the scandals (see Table 1 below). It may be because the reputation is 
more cared by the FSA UK. According to Jopson (2005), it has started to take 
customer satisfaction scheme to improve the regulatory conduct. However, two of the 
three cases in China have not been settled effectively, revealing the weak efficiency. 
 
Table 6.1. The length until the sanction 
 
 The case happened The penalty imposed 
Length of the 
process 
Legal & General 1997 Oct. 2003 5 years 
CGML Aug. 2004 Jun. 2005 1 year 
Gao Shan Case Jan. 2005 2005— — 
Guangxia Case Apr. 2000 Jul. 2001 1year 
Pin An Case Apr. 2003 — — 
 
In brief, in order to get the better control of the financial markets and regulate the 
financial business more effective and efficient, the combination of the two regulatory 
system, which means the harmonization of the political power of the CBRC, CSRC 
and CIRC in China and the flexibility in policy of the FSA UK, is more appropriate. 
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